Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/158883
Authors: 
Delbono, Flavio
Denicolò, Vincenzo
Basevi, Giorgio
Year of Publication: 
1988
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 40
Abstract: 
We analyze games between two countries that use the tariff as a threat to induce each other to follow monetary policies equivalent to those that would obtain under a cooperative game. The analysis shows that under certain assumptions concerning the shares of tariff revenues that the countries spend on imports, the punishment structure, and the discount factors, the outcome of the games converges to a monetary policies. It is suggested that the model could be applaied to current relations between the US, Germany and Japan.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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