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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association [ISSN:] 1869-4195 [Volume:] 6 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Heidelberg [Year:] 2015 [Pages:] 247-278
Verlag: 
Springer, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
We study the consequences of imposing a minimum coverage in an insurance market where enrollment is mandatory and agents have private information on their true risk type. If the regulation is not too stringent, the equilibrium is separating in which a single insurer monopolizes the high risks while the rest attract the low risks, all at positive profits. Hence individuals, regardless of their type, "subsidize" insurers. We study the consequences of imposing a minimum coverage in an insurance market where enrollment is mandatory and agents have private information on their true risk type. If the regulation is not too stringent, the equilibrium is separating in which a single insurer monopolizes the high risks while the rest attract the low risks, all at positive profits. Hence individuals, regardless of their type, "subsidize" insurers.
Schlagwörter: 
Health insurance
Mandatory enrollment
Minimum coverage regulation
Asymmetric information
Market equilibrium
Cross-subsidization
JEL: 
I13
D82
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