Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/158504 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SAFE Working Paper No. 60
Versionsangabe: 
This Draft: July 16, 2016
Verlag: 
Goethe University Frankfurt, SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
We develop a model of managerial compensation structure and asset risk choice. The model provides predictions about the relation between credit spreads and different compensation components. First, we show that credit spreads are decreasing in inside debt only if it is unsecured. Second, the relation between credit spreads and equity incentives varies depending on the features of inside debt. We show that credit spreads are increasing in equity incentives. This relation becomes stronger as the seniority of inside debt increases. Using a sample of U.S. public firms with traded credit default swap contracts, we provide evidence supportive of the model's predictions.
Schlagwörter: 
inside debt
credit spreads
risk-taking
JEL: 
G32
G34
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.32 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.