Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/158027 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 251
Publisher: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Abstract: 
We analyze whether subjects with extensive laboratory experience and first-time participants, who voluntarily registered for the experiment, differ in their behavior. Subjects play four one-shot, two-player games: a trust game, a beauty contest, an ultimatum game, a travelers' dilemma and, in addition, we conduct a singleplayer lying task and elicit risk preferences. We find few significant differences. In the trust game, experienced subjects are less trustworthy and they also trust less. Furthermore, experienced subjects submit fewer non-monotonic strategies in the risk elicitation task. We find no differences whatsoever in the other decisions. Nevertheless, the minor differences observed between experienced and inexperienced subjects may be relevant because we document a potential recruitment bias: the share of inexperienced subjects may be lower in the early recruitment waves.
Subjects: 
dilemma
experienced subjects
laboratory methods
trust game
JEL: 
C90
C70
C72
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-250-9
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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