Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/158026 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 250
Verlag: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Zusammenfassung: 
Entry deterrence can occur when downstream incumbents hold non-controlling ownership shares of a supplier which is commited to charge uniform prices to all downstream firms. The ownership shares imply a rebate on the input price for the incumbents through the profit participation. Such backward ownership induces the supplier to accommodate entry by charging a low uniform price to all downstream firms in case of entry. However, just the entry-accommodating behavior reduces entry profits and thereby can lead to market foreclosure. Based on this theory, the article reviews a merger case in the financial services industry and draws conclusions for regulation and competition policy.
Schlagwörter: 
entry deterrence
foreclosure
minority shareholdings
non-controlling partial ownership
uniform pricing
vertical integration
JEL: 
G34
L22
L40
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-249-3
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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