Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/157964
Authors: 
Morales-Avecedo, Paola
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series 321
Abstract: 
I analyze the repayment decisions of firms with multiple loans that, for liquidity constraints or strategic reasons, stop making payments in some but not all their loans. Using a sample of commercial loans from Colombia over the period 2002:03 - 2012:06, I find that firms are less likely to stop making payments on loans granted by banks with which they have long relationships and by banks with which they have a clean repayment history. These results suggest that firms are concerned with losing the benefits gained through the relationship. I also find that firms are more likely to stop making payments on loans from foreign banks when compared to domestic banks, and equally on loans from state owned banks when compared to private banks. This suggests that the ability and willingness of the bank to punish the firm for misbehaving play an important role in a firm's decision. Overall, the results suggest that firms assess their delinquency choices based on their perceived ability to obtain new loans in the future.
Subjects: 
Payment delinquencies
strategic choice
lending relationship
foreign ownership
state banks
JEL: 
G21
G32
G33
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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