Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/157739 
Year of Publication: 
2016
Citation: 
[Journal:] Logistics Research [ISSN:] 1865-0368 [Volume:] 9 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Heidelberg [Year:] 2016 [Pages:] 1-12
Publisher: 
Springer, Heidelberg
Abstract: 
We consider supplier development within a supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single supplier. Because investments in supplier development are usually relationship-specific, safeguard mechanisms against the hazards of partner opportunism have to be installed. Here, formal contracts are considered as the primary measure to safeguard investments. However, formal contracts entail certain risks, e.g., a lack of flexibility, particular in an ambiguous environment. We propose a receding horizon control scheme to mitigate possible contractual drawbacks while significantly enhancing the supplier development process and, thus, to increase the overall supply chain profit. Our findings are validated by a numerical case study.
Subjects: 
Supply chain management
Supplier development
Optimal control
Receding horizon scheme
Dynamic systems
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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