Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/157288
Authors: 
Sahm, Marco
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
BERG Working Paper Series 121
Abstract: 
I examine sequential round-robin tournaments with three and four symmetric players. Each player is matched once with each other player. If the matches are organized as Tullock contests (all-pay auctions), the tournament will be almost fair (highly discriminatory): subject to the position of their matches in the sequence of the tournament, the differences in players' ex-ante winning probabilities and expected payoffs will be small (large). The differing results originate from the higher discriminating power of the all-pay auction. Moreover, the resulting discouragement effect in tournaments with all-pay auctions implies lower aggregate effort than in tournaments with suitable Tullock contests. The fairness of round-robin tournaments may be improved by the use of an endogenous sequence of matches or the requirement that players fix their effort ex-ante.
Subjects: 
Sequential Round-Robin Tournament
Contest Success Function
Discriminatory Power
Tullock Contest
All-Pay Auction
JEL: 
C72
D72
Z20
ISBN: 
978-3-943153-40-8
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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