Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/156695
Authors: 
Shekhar, Shiva
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
DICE Discussion Paper 247
Abstract: 
We compare a discriminatory pricing regime with a non-discriminatory regime in a competitive bottleneck model where content providers endogenously sort into single or multi-homers. We find that consumer prices rise when the share of single-homers increases in the non-discriminatory case, while they stay constant in the discriminatory pricing regime. A discriminatory pricing regime leads to higher platform profits than the non-discriminatory regime when the share of single-homers are relatively high. When the share of single-homers is relatively high (low), the discriminatory pricing regime leads to higher (lower) consumer surplus and social welfare when compared with the non-discriminatory regime.
Subjects: 
price discrimination
two-sided markets
platforms
platform competition
network effects
JEL: 
D43
L14
L82
L13
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-246-2
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
474.37 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.