Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/156493
Authors: 
Häfner, Samuel
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
WWZ Working Paper 2015/14
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes a discriminatory share auction in which bidders submit non-increasing step functions with a bounded number of steps, the type space consists of private non-increasing marginal valuation functions, and the number of participants is random. I show that the interim utility can be written as a simple functional of the distribution of the allocated quantity. This allows me to derive equilibrium existence and to give a characterization of the equilibrium bid schedules in terms of the individual bidders' optimality conditions. The characterization facilitates the formulation of bounds on the estimates of marginal valuations between the submitted quantity points and permits a simple estimator of the fraction of best response violations among the submitted bids. Proofs of concept for the bounds and the estimator are given by using a novel data set from meat import quota auctions in Switzerland.
Subjects: 
Discriminatory Share Auctions
Random Participation
Estimation
JEL: 
D44
C57
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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