Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/156400
Autoren: 
El-Shagi, Makram
von Schweinitz, Gregor
Datum: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IWH Discussion Papers No. 1/2017
Zusammenfassung: 
Sovereign ratings have frequently failed to predict crises. However, the literature has focused on explaining rating levels rather than the timing of rating announcements. We fill this gap by explicitly differentiating between a decision to assess a country and the actual rating decision. Thereby, we account for rational inattention of rating agencies that exists due to costs of reassessment. Exploiting information of rating announcements, we show that (i) the proposed differentiation significantly improves estimation; (ii) rating agencies consider many nonfundamental factors in their reassessment decision; (iii) markets only react to ratings providing new information; (iv) developed countries get preferential treatment.
Schlagwörter: 
rating agencies
sovereign risk
rational inattention
JEL: 
C25
F34
G24
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
981.65 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.