Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/156365 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
FAU Discussion Papers in Economics No. 07/2017
Verlag: 
Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Institute for Economics, Nürnberg
Zusammenfassung: 
Birth weight manipulation is common in per-case hospital reimbursement systems, in which hospitals receive more money for otherwise equal newborns with birth weight just below compared to just above specific birth weight thresholds. As hospitals receive more money for cases with weight below the thresholds, having a (reported) weight below a threshold could benefit the newborn. Also, these reimbursement thresholds overlap with diagnostic thresholds that have been shown to affect the quantity and quality of care that newborns receive. Based on the universe of hospital births in Germany from the years 2005-2011, we investigate whether weight below reimbursement relevant thresholds triggers different quantity and quality of care. We find that this is not the case, suggesting that hospitals' financial incentives with respect to birth weight do not directly impact the care that newborns receive.
Schlagwörter: 
neonatal care
DRG upcoding
quantity & quality of care
JEL: 
I11
I18
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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