Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/156196
Authors: 
Grundke, Robert
Moser, Christoph
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers in Economics 2016-02
Abstract: 
Can the enforcement of product standards be protectionism in disguise? This paper estimates the costs of non-compliance with U.S. product standards, using a new database on U.S. import refusals from 2002 to 2014. We find that import refusals decrease exports to the United States. This trade reducing effect is driven by developing countries and by refusals without any product sample analysis, in particular during the Subprime Crisis and its aftermath. We also provide evidence that given product standards have been enforced more strictly during the crisis. These results are consistent with the existence of counter-cyclical, hidden protectionism due to non-tariff barriers to trade in the United States.
Subjects: 
hidden protectionism
international trade
developing countries
import refusals
regulatory costs
disaggregated
United States
JEL: 
F13
F14
O24
F63
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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