Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/156146 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IAAEU Discussion Paper Series in Economics No. 03/2016
Verlag: 
University of Trier, Institute for Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU), Trier
Zusammenfassung: 
If input markets are competitive and output per firm declines with the number of firms (business stealing effect), there will be excessive entry into a Cournot oligopoly for a homogeneous commodity. However, input markets are often imperfectly competitive and the price of labor is determined by collective bargaining. The resulting rise in wages reduces output and profits and can deter entry. We analyze under which conditions greater bargaining power by the trade union reduces entry and raises welfare. Furthermore, we show that collective bargaining loosens the linkage between business stealing and excessive entry.
Schlagwörter: 
Endogenous Entry
Oligopoly
Trade Union
Wage Bargaining
Welfare
JEL: 
D43
J51
L13
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
475.28 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.