Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/155661 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper Series in Economics No. 353
Verlag: 
Leuphana Universität Lüneburg, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Lüneburg
Zusammenfassung: 
Recent healthcare reforms have sought to increase efficiency by introducing managed care (MC) as an alternative to conventional care. This article proposes an institutional change designed to let German consumers choose between the two settings through directing payments from the Federal Health Fund to social health insurers (SHIs) or to specialized MC organizations (MCOs). A game involving a SHI, a MCO, and a representative insured (RI) is analyzed. In a 'threeplayer/three-cake' game the coalitions {SHI, MCO}, {MCO, RI}, and {SHI, RI} can form. Players' possibility to switch between coalitions creates new outside options, causing the bilateral Nash bargaining solution to be replaced by the so-called von Neumann-Morgenstern triple.
JEL: 
I13
I11
D02
C72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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