Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/155526
Authors: 
Albrecht, Felix
Kube, Sebastian
Traxler, Christian
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 6284
Abstract: 
We explore the relationship between individuals’ disposition to cooperate and their inclination to engage in peer punishment as well as their relative importance for mitigating social dilemmas. Using a novel strategy-method approach we identify individual punishment patterns and link them with individual cooperation patterns. Classifying N = 628 subjects along these two dimensions documents that cooperation and punishment patterns are intuitively aligned for most individuals. However, the data also reveal a sizable share of free-riders that punish pro-socially and conditional cooperators that do not engage in punishment. Analyzing the interplay between types in an additional experiment, we show that pro-social punishers are more crucial for achieving cooperation than conditional cooperators. Incorporating information on punishment types explains large amounts of the between and within group variation in cooperation.
Subjects: 
strategy method
punishment patterns
type classification
conditional cooperation
public-goods game
JEL: 
C90
D03
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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