Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/155471
Authors: 
Petrick, Martin
Year of Publication: 
2013
Citation: 
[Journal:] European Review of Agricultural Economics [ISSN:] 1464-3618 [Volume:] 40 [Issue:] 4 [Pages:] 707-735
Abstract: 
The article contributes to the understanding of neo-endogenous rural development from the perspective of evolutionary game theory. Rural development is modelled as the increasing realisation over time of gains from interaction by rural stakeholders. The model exhibits two dynamically stable equilibria, which depict declining and prospering regions. An external government authority stimulates neo-endogenous rural development by helping decentralised actors to coordinate on the superior of the two equilibria. This intervention may be possible and desirable without giving up the autonomy of local decision makers. Because initial conditions matter, outcomes cannot be planned or engineered from the outside.
Subjects: 
rural governance
neo-endogenous rural development
evolutionary game theory
collective action
JEL: 
C73
R23
R58
Published Version’s DOI: 
Document Type: 
Article

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