Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/155258 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2001
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 95.2001
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
Non-strategic firms with rational expectations make investment and emissions decisions. The investment rule depends on firms' beliefs about future emissions policies. We compare emissions taxes and quotas when the (strategic) regulator and (nonstrategic) firms have asymmetric information about abatement costs, and all agents use Markov Perfect decision rules. Emissions taxes create a secondary distortion at the investment stage, unless a particular condition holds; emissions quotas do not create a secondary distortion. We solve a linear-quadratic model calibrated to represent the problem of controlling green-house gases. The endogeneity of investment favors taxes, and it increases abatement.
Schlagwörter: 
Pollution control
investment
uncertainty
rational expectations
choice of instruments
JEL: 
C61
D8
H21
Q28
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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