Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/155254
Authors: 
Zhang, Zhongxiang
Assunção, Lucas
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 91.2001
Abstract: 
Experience with existing multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) shows that trade measures agreed to within the MEAs themselves may not necessarily lead to a dispute between parties. On the contrary, there is a great chance that disputes may arise from national measures undertaken to fulfil those obligations under the MEAs. This possibility of conflict with their WTO obligations may well arise in implementing the Kyoto Protocol, given that Article 2 of the Protocol gives Annex 1 countries considerable flexibility in the choice of domestic policies to meet their greenhouse gas emissions commitments. It is highly likely that Annex 1 governments with differentiated legal and political systems might pursue their domestic policies in such a way as to unfairly favour domestic producers over foreign ones. Such differential treatments could occur in governing eligibility for, and the amount of, the subsidy, in establishing energy efficiency standards, in the determinations of the category of eco-labelled products and the procedures of establishing eco-labels, in the specifications in tenders, and in specifying condition for participating in government procurement bids. In case where a country unilaterally imposes a carbon tax, it may adjust taxes at the border to mitigate competitiveness effects of cheaper imports not subject to a similar level of the carbon tax in the country of origin. Measure of this sort may well raise complex questions with respect to the WTO consistency and the conditions under which border taxes can be adjusted to accommodate a loss of international competitiveness. All this clearly indicates the necessity of addressing policy coordination between the trade and climate regimes.Against this background, this paper discusses carbon/energy taxes, subsidies, energy efficiency standards, eco-labels and government procurement policies, and explores the potential interaction between these domestic climate polices and WTO rules. It highlights their potential conflicts, and argues that such conflicts can be avoided or at least minimized if WTO rules are carefully scrutinised at the time Annex 1 governments undertake measures to achieve the required reductions in emissions. The paper suggests an early process of pursuing consultations between WTO members and the Parties to the Climate Change Convention and points to the need of further exploring ways to enhance synergies between the trade and climate regimes.
Subjects: 
Carbon taxes
energy taxes
subsidies
energy efficiency standards
eco-labels
government procurement
WTO
climate change
JEL: 
Q28
Q25
Q48
Q43
F18
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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