Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/155243 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2001
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 80.2001
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper revisits the tragedy of the commons when agents have different capabilities in both production and encroachment activities, and can allocate their time between them. Under fairly general assumptions on production and encroachment technologies, an individual's expected income is convex with respect to his actions so that individuals specialize. Consequently, in equilibrium, the economy is divided into at most two homogeneous groups: encroachers and producers. The partition obeys a relative advantage criterion. Several equilibria may exist. The "tragedy of the commons" equilibrium without production always does; the Pareto optimal allocation of activities may not be an equilibrium. We show that minute changes in property right enforcement may lead to drastic improvements for society. We argue that, in convex games such as this paper's role choice game, bounded rationality is a natural assumption, and the concept of local Nash equilibrium is the natural analytical tool to handle it.
Schlagwörter: 
Property rights
institutions
commons
convexity
general equilibrium
bounded rationality
JEL: 
D23
D62
D7
K00
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
574.9 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.