Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/155238 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2001
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 75.2001
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper we introduce the CLIMNEG World Simulation (CWS) model for simulating cooperative game theoretic aspects of global climate negotiations. The model is derived from the seminal RICE model by Nordhaus and Yang (1996). We first state the necessary conditions that determine optimal investment and emission abatement paths under alternative cooperation regimes, and then we test empirically with a numerical version of the CWS model whether the cooperative game theoretic "core" property of the transfer scheme advocated by Germain, Toint and Tulkens (1997) holds. Under this transfer scheme no individual country, nor any subset of countries, should have an interest in leaving the international environmental agreement. For the numerical specification of the CWS model used here, we obtain the result that this is indeed the case.
Schlagwörter: 
Environmental economics
climate change
burden sharing
simulations
core of cooperative games
JEL: 
C71
C73
D9
D62
F42
Q2
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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