Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/155223 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2001
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 60.2001
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper elaborates on the recent race to sequence the human genome. Starting from the debate on public vs. private research arising from the genome case, the paper shows that in some fundamental research areas, where knowledge externalities play an important role, market and non-market allocation mechanisms do coexist and should coexist in order to ensure socially desirable achievements. A game-theoretic model makes it possible to demonstrate the above results and to characterise some features of an optimal research policy.
Schlagwörter: 
Science
technology
allocation mechanisms
intellectual property rights
welfare
JEL: 
D78
H4
H23
O32
O38
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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