Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/155134
Authors: 
Manzini, Paola
Mariotti, Marco
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 81. 2000
Abstract: 
We present an explicit model of firm-regulator negotiations in a market with several firms. We describe how the regulatory surplus is distributed between firms and regulator, and analyse the impact of various oligopoly parameters on the resulting level of environmental regulation. Our main result is that a "toughest firm principle" holds: the outcome of negotiations is essentially determined by the firm with the most aggressive attitude towards environmental control.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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