Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/155131
Authors: 
Lehmann, Markus A.
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 78. 2000
Abstract: 
The paper takes the viewpoint of the neoinstitutional theory of the firm to analyse Germany's voluntary Dual Management System for Packaging Waste Collection and Recycling (DSD); namely, its governance structure and its contractual relations with upstream and downstream firms. Two aspects crucial for assessing the antitrust implications of voluntary environmental agreements are highlighted. First, the institutional fine-tuning of a voluntary agreement matters when assessing its implications for market competition. Second, the design of the threat with respect to the instruments it prescribes is of crucial importance for the degree of centralisation and the anti-competitive impact of the private institutions that subsequently emerge.
Subjects: 
Voluntary environmental agreements
antitrust
theory of the firm
waste management
JEL: 
D62
D78
L22
L44
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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