Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/155127
Authors: 
Poyago-Theotoky, Joanna
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 74. 2000
Abstract: 
We consider a setting where firms undertake emission-reducing R&D and the regulator, who sets the emission tax, is unable to commit credibly. Firms are subject to research spillovers in emission reduction. We examine two regimes with respect to the organization of R&D: independent R&D and an environmental R&D cartel (ERC). Environmental R&D is higher in the ERC compared to independent R&D for small damages and also for large damages when R&D is efficient. In contrast, when damages are large and R&D is inefficient the opposite is true. The same ranking applies to the comparison of social welfare.
Subjects: 
Environmental R&D Cartels
Environmental Research Joint Venture
Cooperative R&D
Emission Tax
JEL: 
O32
L13
Q28
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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