Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/155109 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2000
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 55. 2000
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
When modelling data generated from a discrete choice contingent valuation question, the treatment of zero bids affects the welfare estimates. Zero bids may come from respondents who are not interested in the provision of the public good; alternatively, some zero-bidders may be protesting about the valuation exercise, but hold positive values for the good. In this paper we investigate the effect of different levels of information on zero-bidders on welfare estimates for the population. We find that different strategies of identification may have non-trivial effects. We recommend use of full debriefing questions for zero-bidders, and use of sample selection models to correct for bias caused by protest behaviour.
Schlagwörter: 
Contingent valuation
zero bids
protest votes
selectivity bias
sample selection model
survey design
JEL: 
C35
C51
C81
D60
H41
Q26
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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