Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/155096 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2000
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 42. 2000
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
Leniency programmes reduce sanctions for law violators that self-report. We focus on their ability to deter cartels and organised crime in general by increasing incentives to "cheat" on partners. Moderate leniency programmes that reduce/cancel sanctions for the reporting party cannot affect organised crime. Courageous leniency programmes that reward self-reporting parties may completely and costlessly deter it. When fines/rewards are pure transfers, optimal leniency programmes maximise rewards for self-reporting. When financing rewards are costly, optimal leniency programmes are restricted to the first reporting party, and make this residual claimant for the fines paid by the others.
Schlagwörter: 
Self reporting
law enforcement
antitrust
cartel deterrence
crime deterrence
organised crime
collusion
corruption
illegal trade
JEL: 
K42
K21
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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