Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/155096
Authors: 
Spagnolo, Giancarlo
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 42. 2000
Abstract: 
Leniency programmes reduce sanctions for law violators that self-report. We focus on their ability to deter cartels and organised crime in general by increasing incentives to "cheat" on partners. Moderate leniency programmes that reduce/cancel sanctions for the reporting party cannot affect organised crime. Courageous leniency programmes that reward self-reporting parties may completely and costlessly deter it. When fines/rewards are pure transfers, optimal leniency programmes maximise rewards for self-reporting. When financing rewards are costly, optimal leniency programmes are restricted to the first reporting party, and make this residual claimant for the fines paid by the others.
Subjects: 
Self reporting
law enforcement
antitrust
cartel deterrence
crime deterrence
organised crime
collusion
corruption
illegal trade
JEL: 
K42
K21
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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