Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/155053 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1999
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 100.1999
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
Why do money and markets crowd out co-operative relations? This paper characterises the effects of intertemporal preferences, money, and markets on players' ability to co-operate in material-payoff supergames. Players' aversion to intertemporal substitution facilitates co-operation by decreasing their evaluation of short-run gains from deviations and increasing that of losses from punishments. Goods' markets and money may hinder co-operation by allowing players to reallocate short-run gains from deviations in time, at some cost. Allowing for free intertemporal reallocation of payoffs, perfect financial markets always make co-operation harder. Financial markets' imperfections facilitate co-operation by opposing this effect.
Schlagwörter: 
Co-operation
repeated games
Prisoner's dilemma
commons
reciprocal exchange
implicit contracts
collusion
institutions
JEL: 
C72
D51
O17
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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