Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/155037
Authors: 
Calzolari, Giacomo
Scarpa, Carlo
Year of Publication: 
1999
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 84.1999
Abstract: 
In this paper we analyse a common agency model in which agents can choose with how many principals they want to work, while principals cannot condition contracts on the agent's decision to accept other contracts. In this case of "non-intrinsic" common agency we characterise the equilibrium. Unless the substitutability between the two outputs is very strong, optimality conditions for principals' contracts are the same as with intrinsic common agency. However, principals suffer from reciprocal competition, which with "moderate" substitutability increases the informational rent agents obtain in equilibrium.
JEL: 
L14
L41
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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