Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/155012
Authors: 
Manzini, Paola
Mariotti, Marco
Year of Publication: 
1999
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 58.1999
Abstract: 
We model club formation as a non-cooperative game of coalition formation and surplus division. We show how social norms and individual rationality sustain a particular form of collective inefficiency, namely excessive entry in the joint production and exploitation of an excludable good. We term this phenomenon the "tragedy of the clubs". The tragedy of the clubs is a pervasive equilibrium phenomenon.
Subjects: 
Clubs
Coalition formation
Multiperson bargaining
JEL: 
C78
D71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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