Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/154979
Authors: 
Battigalli, Pierpaolo
Siniscalchi, Marciano
Year of Publication: 
1999
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 25.1999
Abstract: 
We use an extensive form, universal type space to provide the following epistemic characterisation of extensive form rationalisability. Say that player i strongly believes event E if i is certain of E conditional on each of her information sets consistent with E. Our main contribution is to show that a strategy profile s is extensive form rationalisable if and only if there is a state in which s is played and (0) everybody is rational, (1) everybody strongly believes (0), (2) everybody strongly believes (0) & (1), (3) everybody strongly believes (0) & (1) & (2), .... This result also allows us to provide sufficient epistemic conditions for the backward induction outcome and to relate extensive form rationalisability and conditional common certainty of rationality.
Subjects: 
Rationalisability
Extensive Form Games
JEL: 
C7
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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