Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/154946
Authors: 
Petrakis, Emmanuel
Xepapadeas, Anastasios P.
Year of Publication: 
1998
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro 88.1998
Abstract: 
This paper investigates the effect of credibility of environmental policies on environmental innovation and welfare. When the government precommits to an emission tax, the monopolist's abatement effort is lower than if the environmental policy is at the government's discretion. Time consistent emission tax is lower than optimal emission tax under precommitment. Finally, welfare is always higher if the government can commit to an emission tax.
Subjects: 
Monopoly
Non-credible policies
Precommitment
Emission Tax
Abatement effort
JEL: 
L12
Q25
Q28
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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