Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/154920 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1998
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 62.1998
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
International environmental agreements aiming at correcting negative externalities generated by transboundary pollution are difficult to achieve for many reasons. Important obstacles arise from asymmetry in costs and benefits, and instability may occur due to the fact that coalitions of countries may attempt to do better for themselves outside of any proposed agreement. In a static context it has already been shown that it is possible to achieve stability in the sense of the core of a co-operative game, by means of appropriately defined transfers between the countries involved. However, the transboundary pollution problems that are most important are caused by accumulated pollutants so that a dynamic analysis is required. This paper provides a transfer scheme that yields a core property in a dynamic context. The possibility of computing such transfers numerically is discussed.
Schlagwörter: 
Transfontier pollution
Stock pollutant
Dynamic co-operative games
Coalitions
Core solution
JEL: 
C73
D62
F42
H4
Q3
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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