Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/154914
Authors: 
Schmidt, Carsten
Year of Publication: 
1998
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 56.1998
Abstract: 
This paper surveys the rapidly growing theoretical literature on international environmental agreements. The surveyed contributions are classified according to the conceivable strategies to create incentives for the participation in and compliance with environmental conventions. The proposed taxonomy of instruments consists of (i) the choice and particular form of the internalisation instrument; (ii) carrot-stick strategies that make co-operative pollution reductions dependent on the past behaviour of other countries (internal stabilization); (iii) transfers and sanctions of various forms (external stabilization); (iv) unilateral and accompanying measures by single countries or subcoalitions; and (v) long-term provisions to increase the flexibility of agreements and to improve the framework conditions for international negotiations.
Subjects: 
International environmental agreements
Co-operation
Transboundary environmental externalities
Incentive compatibility
Enforcement
JEL: 
D62
D7
F02
H21
Q28
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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