Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/154910 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1998
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 52.1998
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
The rules under which jurisdictions (nations, provinces) can deny immigration or expel residents are generally governed by a constitution, but there do not exist either positive or normative analyses to suggest what types of exclusion rules are best. We stylise this problem by suggesting four constitutional rules of admission: free mobility, admission by majority vote, admission by unanimous consent, admission by a demand threshold for public goods. In a simple model we characterise the equilibria that result from these rules, and provide a positive theory for which constitutional rule will be chosen.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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