Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/154910
Authors: 
Jéhiel, Philippe
Scotchmer, Suzanne
Year of Publication: 
1998
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 52.1998
Abstract: 
The rules under which jurisdictions (nations, provinces) can deny immigration or expel residents are generally governed by a constitution, but there do not exist either positive or normative analyses to suggest what types of exclusion rules are best. We stylise this problem by suggesting four constitutional rules of admission: free mobility, admission by majority vote, admission by unanimous consent, admission by a demand threshold for public goods. In a simple model we characterise the equilibria that result from these rules, and provide a positive theory for which constitutional rule will be chosen.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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