Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/154892
Authors: 
Valletti, Tommaso M.
Year of Publication: 
1998
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 34.1998
Abstract: 
This paper considers a vertically separated industry with an upstream monopolist who supplies an essential input to two downstream Cournot firms. This situation is relevant to a number of sectors, including the telecommunications industry where trunk operators must have access to the local network of an incumbent firm to provide their long-distance service. The paper analyses two-part access pricing and input price discrimination under different regulatory settings, and it finds that discrimination may produce adverse welfare effects when it is practised by the unregulated upstream firm.
Subjects: 
Access pricing
Input price discrimination
JEL: 
D43
L51
L96
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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