Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/154871 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1998
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 13.1998
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
The aim of this paper is to discuss the role played by international institutions in achieving effective International Environmental Agreements. We emphasise the strategic nature of environmental negotiations and use a game theoretic model of coalitional bargaining to illustrate the main issues. We argue that international institutions can intervene in the framing of the strategic interactions between countries (i.e. setting the rules of the negotiation game) and can influence the actual agreement reached when different outcomes of the negotiation game can be equilibria.
Schlagwörter: 
Coalition formation
Environmental agreements
Institutions
Bargaining
Co-operation
JEL: 
Q3
C7
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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