Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/154871
Authors: 
Ecchia, Giulio
Mariotti, Marco
Year of Publication: 
1998
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 13.1998
Abstract: 
The aim of this paper is to discuss the role played by international institutions in achieving effective International Environmental Agreements. We emphasise the strategic nature of environmental negotiations and use a game theoretic model of coalitional bargaining to illustrate the main issues. We argue that international institutions can intervene in the framing of the strategic interactions between countries (i.e. setting the rules of the negotiation game) and can influence the actual agreement reached when different outcomes of the negotiation game can be equilibria.
Subjects: 
Coalition formation
Environmental agreements
Institutions
Bargaining
Co-operation
JEL: 
Q3
C7
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.