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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1998
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 12.1998
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
Since the framework convention of Rio, actual environmental negotiations on climate change aim at inducing all world countries to sign global environmental agreements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Despite the past unsuccessful attempts, even current negotiations seem to pursue the same objective. This paper shows from a game-theoretic viewpoint that the emergence of agreements signed by all countries is quite unlikely, even in the presence of appropriate and multi-issues negotiation strategies and transfers. Either a single partial agreement or a coalition structure in which regional environmental agreements to control climate change are signed are the most likely outcomes. The paper compares these two cases and argues that regional agreements may increase both countries welfare and environmental quality.
Schlagwörter: 
Non-cooperative game theory
Endogenous formation of coalitions
Environmental agreements
Climate change
JEL: 
C72
H41
Q40
Q48
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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