Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/154849 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1997
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 87.1997
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
Superfund cleanup has been extremely slow. Traditional analysis has centred around reducing the heavy negotiation and litigation to expedite the cleanup process. This paper investigates other factors which provide possible incentives for the PRPs to delay the cleanup, namely discounting, risk aversion, and compensation for off-site damage. Liability share is found to play an essential role in PRP's incentives to delay. Commonly adopted EPA strategies, such as negotiating with PRP steering committees and buying out de minimis PRPs, may provide incentives to delay the cleanup. The paper also designs a Bayesian mechanism for information extraction, and finds that the lump sum transfer mechanism is not always efficient.
Schlagwörter: 
Environmental economics
Superfund
CERCLA
Potentially responsible parties (PRPs)
Strategic information transmission
Strategic delay
Environmental remediation
Cleanup
JEL: 
D82
Q28
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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