Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/154844
Authors: 
Millock, Katrin
Salanié, François
Year of Publication: 
1997
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 82.1997
Abstract: 
We analyse the regulation of nonpoint source pollution. In particular, we study the use of peer monitoring to sustain co-operative abatement by a group of polluters. Delegation to a group of polluters has sometimes been proposed under a policy of so called voluntary abatement accords. By solving the problem of a regulator who a priori does not know whether agents are co-operative or not, we explain some features of voluntary abatement accords. The analysis shows that the policy measure proposed in the literature for nonpoint source regulation - an ambient tax - may not be efficient.
Subjects: 
Peer monitoring
Co-operation
Voluntary abatement accords
Environmental regulation
Ambient tax
Incomplete information
JEL: 
D82
H41
Q25
Q28
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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