Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/154831
Authors: 
Barba Navaretti, Giorgio
Dasgupta, Partha
Mäler, Karl-Göran
Siniscalco, Domenico
Year of Publication: 
1997
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 68.1997
Abstract: 
This paper investigates institutions for the creation and transmission of knowledge as efficient resource allocation mechanisms. By looking at Science and Technology it develops a two way classification. Science, is a non market allocation mechanism, where knowledge is treated as a pure public good and where the rule of priority provides an incentive scheme for disclosure. Technology, is a market allocation mechanism, where knowledge is treated as a private good and where patents and copyrights preserve property rights. The distinction between these two entities is based on the institutional arrangements involving the allocation of resources for enquiry, not on the differences in the objects and methods of inquiry. The paper compares the rule of priority and patenting as alternative incentive schemes. It also discusses whether it is optimal for society to preserve two different institutions, partly rival and partly complementary, and examines the major policy implications.
Subjects: 
Science
Technology
Institutions
Incentives
Property rights
Externalities
JEL: 
O31
O34
O32
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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