Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/154823
Authors: 
Guelpa, Fabrizio
Year of Publication: 
1997
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 60.1997
Abstract: 
In this paper we propose a formalised model which describes the trade-off problems faced by a firm desiring to create a structure of governance that deals both with the problems of supervising the work of its managers (corporate governance) and with the transactional problems arising from its contractual relations with other stakeholders, in particular suppliers and clients (contractual governance). The public company and the business group stylise two alternative solutions to this problem. Our model recognises the fact that there may be different mechanisms of governance in different industries, historical periods or countries, and that these may be modified as a result of technological shocks, changes in the rate of growth in demand, or innovations introduced by some companies in the production chain.
Subjects: 
Business groups
Public company
Relationship Specific investment
Agency
JEL: 
G32
D23
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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