Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Brunello, Giorgio
Ishikawa, Tsuneo
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 44.1997
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
We present a model where the interaction between competition at school, industrial structure and labour market outcomes is characterised by the concept of Nash decentralised equilibrium. We show that the presence of spillovers and strategic complementarities could generate multiple equilibria. In one equilibrium, a competitive schooling system induces individuals to accumulate basic academic skills, large firms hire mainly new school graduates and there is limited labour turnover. In another equilibrium, schooling is less competitive and individuals focus more on idiosyncratic skills, large firms hire mainly experienced workers and labour turnover is important. We argue in the paper that the main features of each equilibrium are consistent with key stylised facts of the Italian and the Japanese labour markets.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.