Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/154708 
Year of Publication: 
2015
Citation: 
[Journal:] IZA Journal of Labor Policy [ISSN:] 2193-9004 [Volume:] 4 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Heidelberg [Year:] 2015 [Pages:] 1-26
Publisher: 
Springer, Heidelberg
Abstract: 
We evaluate the potential of wage subsidy programs for reducing non-employment of the disabled by exploiting a reform of the Danish Flexjob scheme targeted towards employing the long-term (partially) disabled. Firms received a salary reimbursement for all employees granted a Flexjob. We examine whether a change from full to partial reimbursement to governmental units affected the share of Flexjobs allocated to retained (insiders) versus non-employed hirees (outsiders). After the reform, the composition of hires changed substantially in favor of insiders, both in absolute and relative terms. A reduction in subsidies thus leads to a decrease in the hiring of the non-employed disabled.
Subjects: 
Disability
Wage subsidies
Non-employment
Difference-in-differences
JEL: 
I38
J14
C21
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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