Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/154370
Authors: 
Ongena, Steven
Popov, Alexander
Van Horen, Neeltje
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
ECB Working Paper 1937
Abstract: 
Using proprietary data on banks’ monthly securities holdings, we find that during the European sovereign debt crisis, domestic banks in fiscally stressed countries were considerably more likely than foreign banks to increase their holdings of domestic sovereign bonds in months with relatively high domestic sovereign bond issuance. This effect is stronger for state?owned banks and for banks with low initial holdings of domestic sovereign bonds, and it is not fuelled by Central Bank liquidity provision. Our results point to a “moral suasion” mechanism, and cannot be explained by concurrent risk?shifting, carry?trading, regulatory compliance, or shocks to investment opportunities.
Subjects: 
sovereign debt
JEL: 
F34
G21
H63
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
ISBN: 
978-92-899-2185-5
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.