Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/154086 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ECB Working Paper No. 1653
Verlag: 
European Central Bank (ECB), Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
I show that the zero nominal interest rate bound may render it desirable for society to appoint a fiscally activist policy-maker who cares less about the stabilisation of government spending relative to inflation and output gap stabilisation than the private sector does. I work with a simple New Keynesian model where the government has to decide each period afresh about the optimal level of public consumption and the one period nominal interest rate. A fiscally activist policy-maker uses government spending more aggressively to stabilise inflation and the output gap in a liquidity trap than an authority with preferences identical to those of society as a whole would do. The appointment of an activist policy-maker corrects for discretionary authorities’ disregard of the expectations channel, thereby reducing the welfare costs associated with zero bound events.
Schlagwörter: 
discretion
fiscal policy
monetary policy
zero nominal interest rate bound
JEL: 
E52
E62
E63
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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