Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/153947 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ECB Working Paper No. 1514
Verlag: 
European Central Bank (ECB), Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
The empirical literature on systemic banking crises (SBCs) has shown that SBCs are rare events that break out in the midst of credit intensive booms and bring about particularly deep and long-lasting recessions. We attempt to explain these phenomena within a dynamic general equilibrium model featuring a non-trivial banking sector. In the model, banks are heterogeneous with respect to their intermediation skills, which gives rise to an interbank market. Moral hazard and asymmetric information on this market may generate sudden interbank market freezes, SBCs, credit crunches and, ultimately, severe recessions. Simulations of a calibrated version of the model indicate that typical SBCs break out in the midst of a credit boom generated by a sequence of positive supply shocks rather than being the outcome of a big negative wealth shock. We also show that the model can account for the relative severity of recessions with SBCs and their longer duration.
Schlagwörter: 
Asymmetric information
credit crunch
lending boom
Moral Hazard
systemic banking crisis
JEL: 
E32
E44
G01
G21
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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